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19 
JUDGES, JURIES, AND SCIENTIFIC 
EVIDENCE 
Valerie P. Hans*1 
INTRODUCTION 
The rise in scientific evidence offered in American jury trials, 
along with court rulings thrusting judges into the business of 
assessing the soundness of scientific evidence, have produced 
challenges for judge and jury alike.2 Many judges have taken up the 
                                                           
 * Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. Address correspondence to: 
Valerie P. Hans, Cornell Law School, Myron Taylor Hall, Ithaca NY 14853; 
valerie.hans@cornell.edu. 
1 Author’s Note: This article had its origins in a presentation at the Science 
for Judges IX conference at Brooklyn Law School, April 13–14, 2007. I thank 
Margaret Berger for inviting me to speak at the conference and for encouraging 
me to educate judges about jury science by having them participate directly in 
research. I was gratified by the willingness of many judges who generously 
agreed to take part. Shari Diamond and Jeffrey Rachlinski made extremely 
helpful recommendations about the judge research project. Margaret Berger and 
Jeffrey Rachlinski also offered insightful reactions to the original draft of this 
article. 
 This article draws on findings from a mock jury research project funded by 
Grant No. 2002-IJ-CX-0026 awarded by the National Institute of Justice, Office 
of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice. Michael Dann, David Kaye, 
Erin Farley, and Stephanie Albertson were my collaborators on the jury research 
project. Points of view expressed in this article are mine and do not necessarily 
represent the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
2 Samuel R. Gross, Expert Evidence, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 1113 (1991) 
(documenting substantial presence of expert witnesses); Margaret A. Berger, The 
Supreme Court’s Trilogy on the Admissibility of Expert Testimony, in 9 
FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 
(2d ed. 2000) [hereinafter FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER]. The trilogy of cases that 
led to an enhanced gatekeeper role for federal judges include, in chronological 
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duty of becoming “amateur scientists”3 by participating in judicial 
workshops like Science for Judges conferences, acquiring some 
degree of familiarity with scientific methodology and scientific 
principles.4 Judges also can use background resources like the 
Federal Judicial Center’s Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence, 
which includes superb comprehensive overviews of scientific fields 
and techniques.5 Science-minded law clerks can also provide 
invaluable support. Finally, in especially complex cases, judges 
may employ special masters or court-appointed experts.6 
But what about juries? Surely they too could benefit from 
assistance as they attempt to master and apply complex testimony 
about scientific matters during the course of a trial. Concerns about 
the jury’s ability to understand, critically evaluate, and employ 
scientific evidence in deciding complex trials have led to many 
suggestions for reform. Nevertheless, most jurors sit on a single 
case, are not screened for scientific background knowledge, and 
adopt a predominantly passive role as fact-finders within the 
adversary system. How well do laypersons understand complex 
scientific and technical testimony presented in this adversarial 
context? If they need help, how can jury assistance be integrated 
into the unique setting of the jury trial? After all, we are not likely 
                                                           
order: Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993); General 
Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997); Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 
U.S. 137 (1999). See also Margaret A. Berger, Science for Judges I: Papers on 
Toxicology and Epidemiology, 12 J.L. & POL’Y 1 (2003). 
3 In his dissenting opinion in the Daubert case, Justice William Rehnquist 
wrote that “I defer to no one in my confidence in federal judges. . . . But I do 
not think [Rule 702 imposes on judges] either the obligation or the authority to 
become amateur scientists . . . .” 509 U.S. at 600–01. 
4 There have been a total of nine Science for Judges conferences, ably 
organized by Professor Margaret Berger of Brooklyn Law School. The collected 
papers may be found at the Science for Judges website, http://www.brooklaw. 
edu/centers/scienceforjudges/ (last visited Nov. 30, 2007). 
5 FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, supra note 2. 
6 Joe S. Cecil & Thomas E. Willging, Accepting Daubert’s Invitation: 
Defining a Role for Court-Appointed Experts in Assessing Scientific Validity, 
43 EMORY L. J. 995 (1994) (finding that judges infrequently appointed experts, 
because many cases did not require court-appointed experts and judges saw such 
practice as a fundamental intrusion on the adversary system). 
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to require jurors to undertake background reading, send them off to 
workshops, or hire instructors to get them up to speed before they 
evaluate scientific expert testimony in their trials. 
This article begins by summarizing what we currently know 
about how juries respond to scientific evidence. Then, it describes a 
mock jury experiment that my research collaborators and I 
conducted to examine whether trial reforms could improve jurors’ 
comprehension and appropriate use of scientific evidence, 
specifically mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA) evidence.7 This article 
also reports the intriguing findings of a new study involving state 
and federal judges who watched clips of the same mtDNA mock 
trial and answered some of the same questions as the jurors.8 The 
article concludes with a consideration of the implications of the 
judge and jury mtDNA studies for three broad remedies often 
suggested to deal with jury trials involving complex cases: (1) 
having judges instead of juries decide the cases; (2) using “blue 
ribbon” juries of highly educated citizens; and (3) implementing 
                                                           
7 The study is reported in B. MICHAEL DANN, VALERIE P. HANS & 
DAVID H. KAYE, TESTING THE EFFECTS OF SELECTED JURY TRIAL 
INNOVATIONS ON JUROR COMPREHENSION OF CONTESTED MTDNA EVIDENCE, 
FINAL TECHNICAL REPORT  (2004), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/ 
pdffiles1/nij/grants/211000.pdf [hereinafter TESTING THE EFFECTS]. The findings 
regarding jury innovations are summarized in B. Michael Dann, Valerie P. Hans 
& David H. Kaye, Can Jury Trial Innovations Improve Juror Understanding of 
DNA Evidence?, 90 JUDICATURE 152 (2007) [hereinafter Jury Trial Innovations 
and Juror Understanding]. Analysis of the jurors’ treatment of statistics and 
probability may be found in David H. Kaye, Valerie P. Hans, B. Michael Dann, 
Erin J. Farley & Stephanie Albertson, Statistics in the Jury Box: How Jurors 
Respond to Mitochondrial DNA Match Probabilities, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL 
STUD. 797 (2007) [hereinafter Statistics in the Jury Box]. Analysis of jurors’ 
treatment of the biological science may be found in Valerie P. Hans, David H. 
Kaye, B. Michael Dann, Erin J. Farley & Stephanie Albertson, Science in the 
Jury Box: Jurors’ Views and Understanding of Mitochondrial DNA Evidence 
(October 29, 2007) (Cornell Legal Studies Research Paper No 07-021), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1025582 [hereinafter Science in the Jury 
Box]. 
8 Judges attending the Science for Judges IX workshop participated in the 
study as part of my presentation on jury research methodology and jurors’ 
reactions to scientific evidence. See supra note 1, and infra Part IV, The Judge 
MtDNA Study. 
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trial innovations.9 
I.  COMPLEX SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE AND JURY FACT FINDING 
COMPETENCE 
Researchers have studied the performance of juries in criminal 
and civil trials for more than fifty years.10 Multiple methods are 
employed to explore jury competence, including comparison of 
jury verdicts with judicial evaluations, analysis of verdict patterns 
and trends, questionnaires and interviews with jurors and other trial 
participants, and mock jury studies.11 Each of these methods has 
particular strengths and limitations.12 Nonetheless, taken as a 
whole, the scholarly work indicates that juries do quite well in 
understanding most trial evidence. 
Studies have asked judges to evaluate jury verdicts and to 
provide the verdict they would have reached had they been 
deciding the case.13 These projects have routinely found substantial 
                                                           
9 The literature on the topic of jury competence in complex cases, and 
discussion of these reforms, is substantial. For an overview of the debate, see 
NEIL VIDMAR & VALERIE P. HANS, AMERICAN JURIES: THE VERDICT, ch. 7 & 
8 (2007). For information about the historical development and current 
status of the special jury, see JAMES C. OLDHAM, TRIAL BY JURY: THE 
SEVENTH AMENDMENT AND ANGLO-AMERICAN SPECIAL JURIES (2006). 
See also Michael A. Fisher, Going for the Blue Ribbon: The Legality of 
Expert Juries in Patent Litigation , 2 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 1 
(2000–2001). 
10 See VIDMAR & HANS, supra note 9 (summarizing jury research and 
concluding that juries are generally competent as fact-finders). 
11 Shari Seidman Diamond, How Jurors Deal with Expert Testimony and 
How Judges Can Help, J.L. & POL’Y (forthcoming Jan. 2008); Valerie P. Hans 
& Stephanie Albertson, Empirical Research and Civil Jury Reform, 78 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1497, 1500–03 (2003). 
12 Hans & Albertson, supra note 11, at 1500–03. 
13 PAULA L. HANNAFORD-AGOR, VALERIE P. HANS, NICOLE L. MOTT & 
G. THOMAS MUNSTERMAN, ARE HUNG JURIES A PROBLEM? (National Center 
for State Courts 2002), available at http://www.ncsconline.org/WC/ 
Publications/Res_Juries_HungJuriesProblemPub.pdf (describing a study in four 
U.S. state courts in which judges and juries completed post-trial questionnaires 
about felony trials, including preferred verdicts); Larry Heuer & Steven D. 
Penrod, Trial Complexity: A Field Investigation of Its Meaning and Its Effects, 
HANS FINAL DRAFT FOR AUTHORIZATION 8.DOC 2/11/08  9:12 PM 
 JUDGES, JURIES, AND SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 23 
verdict agreement between judges and juries.14 Analyses of the 
factors that contribute to jury verdicts have found that the strength 
of trial evidence, whether it is rated by judges or juries, is the most 
important determinant of jury verdicts.15 Furthermore, the 
agreement rates of judge and jury are similar in both straightforward 
and complex trials, indicating that failure to understand the 
evidence is not a major determinant of judge-jury disagreement.16 
Instead, many disagreements are explained by the fact that 
compared to judges, juries appear to require a stronger case by the 
prosecution to convict the defendant; or by the fact that juries 
infuse community notions of justice into their verdicts.17 
Although the jury’s general “report card” would make most 
parents happy, jurors themselves have identified the task of 
interpreting scientific and technical evidence and expert testimony 
as particularly challenging.18 Case studies examining juror 
                                                           
18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 29 (1994) (describing study of jury innovations that 
included judicial assessments); HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE 
AMERICAN JURY (Little, Brown 1966) (describing study in which judges 
evaluated jury trials and provided hypothetical verdicts). 
14 HANNAFORD-AGOR ET AL., supra note 13, at 55–56 (reporting agreement 
in most cases); Heuer & Penrod, supra note 13, at 46–48 (showing substantial 
agreement); KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 13, at 58 (finding a 78% agreement 
in criminal jury trials), 63 (finding a 78% agreement in civil jury trials). 
15 Theodore Eisenberg, Paula L. Hannaford-Agor, Valerie P. Hans, Nicole 
L. Mott, G. Thomas Munsterman, Stewart J. Schwab & Martin T. Wells, 
Judge-jury Agreement in Criminal Cases: A Partial Replication of Kalven & 
Zeisel’s The American Jury, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 171, 196–98 (2005) 
(finding that the strength of evidence, whether rated by jurors or by judges, is 
the strongest factor in explaining a verdict); Steven P. Garvey, Paula L. 
Hannaford-Agor, Valerie P. Hans, Nicole L. Mott, G. T. Munsterman & Martin 
T. Wells, Juror First Votes in Criminal Trials, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 
371, 380 (2004) (finding strength of evidence is the most important factor 
determining first votes of jurors). 
16 Eisenberg et al., supra note 15, at 190–92 (rates of judge-jury 
disagreement not strongly linked to case complexity); Heuer & Penrod, supra 
note 13, at 46–48 (no effect of case complexity on judge-jury agreement); 
KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 13, at 157 (judge-jury disagreement similar in 
easy and difficult cases). 
17 Eisenberg et al., supra note 15, at 185–89; KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra 
note 13, at 111–17. 
18 See summaries of the research by Joseph S. Cecil, Valerie P. Hans & 
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comprehension of scientific testimony, and some experimental 
research, point out the types of expert evidence that can present 
problems for juries.19 For example, statistical and economic 
evidence is particularly challenging to jurors.20 DNA evidence, 
particularly the statistical arguments and inferences that may be 
drawn from evidence of a match between DNA found at a crime 
scene and a suspect’s DNA, can also present problems for jurors.21 
However, because agreement rates with legal experts do not differ 
as a function of case complexity, we have some confidence that 
difficulties that juries might have with complex evidence do not 
seem to be major contributors to unreasonable verdicts.22 
                                                           
Elizabeth C. Wiggins, Citizen Comprehension of Difficult Issues: Lessons from 
Civil Jury Trials, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 727, 728–29 (1991); Neil Vidmar & 
Shari Seidman Diamond, Juries and Expert Evidence, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 
1121, 1126 (2001); Sanja Kutnjak Ivković & Valerie P. Hans, Jurors’ 
Evaluations of Expert Testimony: Judging the Messenger and the Message, 28 
LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 441, 442 (2003). 
19 Two case studies reached critical conclusions about jury comprehension 
of scientific and technical testimony: MOLLY SELVIN & LARRY PICUS, THE 
DEBATE OVER JURY PERFORMANCE: OBSERVATIONS FROM A RECENT ASBESTOS 
CASE (1987); and JOSEPH SANDERS, BENDECTIN ON TRIAL 117–42 (1998). 
20 Statistics in the Jury Box, supra note 7; Michael J. Saks & Robert F. 
Kidd, Human Information Processing and Adjudication: Trial by Heuristics, 
15 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 123, 149 (1981); David H. Kaye & Jonathan J. 
Koehler, Can Jurors Understand Probabilistic Evidence?, 154 J. ROYAL STAT. 
SOC’Y ANN. 75 (1991); William C. Thompson, Are Juries Competent to 
Evaluate Statistical Evidence?, 52 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9 (1989). 
21 Dale A. Nance & Scott B. Morris, An Empirical Assessment of 
Presentation Formats for Trace Evidence with a Relatively Large and 
Quantifiable Random Match Probability, 42 JURIMETRICS  J. 403 (2002); Dale 
A. Nance & Scott B. Morris, Juror Understanding of DNA Evidence: An  
Empirical Assessment of Presentation Formats for Trace Evidence with a 
Relatively Small Random Match Probability, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 395 (2005); 
Jason Schklar & Shari Seidman Diamond, Juror Reactions to DNA Evidence: 
Errors and Expectancies, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 159 (1999); Brian C. 
Smith et al., Jurors’ Use of Probabilistic Evidence, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 
49 (1996); William C. Thompson & Edward L. Schumann, Interpretation of 
Statistical Evidence in Criminal Trials: The Prosecutor’s Fallacy and the 
Defense Attorney’s Fallacy, 11 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 167, 180 (1987). 
22 See Eisenberg et al., supra note 15, at 190–92; Heuer & Penrod, supra 
note 13, at 46–48; KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 13, at 157. 
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Supporting this view, Richard Lempert’s review of thirteen 
complex trials concluded that even when juries did not completely 
understand all of the scientific and technical details, jurors could 
usually comprehend enough of the testimony to engage in rational 
decision making.23 
How judges fare with similarly complex scientific material has 
not been extensively studied. Although political scientists and 
other scholars have conducted many analyses of judicial decisions 
and opinions, the research literature on judicial reactions to 
scientific evidence is modest.24  The most extensive project to date 
surveyed 400 judges about their opinions on the Daubert case, and 
asked questions regarding related scientific concepts, including 
falsifiability, error rate, peer review, publication, and general 
acceptance.25 In the survey, judges showed very good 
understanding of peer review, publication, and general acceptance; 
they had more trouble with the concepts of falsifiability and error 
rate.26 Other research suggests that judges might be susceptible, as 
lay persons are, to various cognitive processing errors and biases, 
which in turn could compromise their ability to make sound 
inferences from scientific and statistical evidence.27 In sum, 
                                                           
23 Richard Lempert, Civil Juries and Complex Cases: Taking Stock After 
Twelve Years, in VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 181 (Robert 
Litan ed., 1993). Professor Lempert rated the jury verdicts as high, moderate, or 
low on their defensibility and concluded that although eleven verdicts were 
highly or moderately defensible, two of the thirteen jury verdicts were low on 
defensibility. Id. 
24 Scholars have observed that “few systematic studies of judicial decision 
making exist.” Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, 
Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 781 (2001) (reporting 
empirical study of judicial decision making). Scholarly study has focused on 
other issues such as the role of the judge’s political views or personal 
characteristics and the dynamics of opinion writing. See LAWRENCE BAUM, THE 
PUZZLE OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR (1997). 
25 Sophia I. Gatowski, Shirley A. Dobbin, James T. Richardson, Gerald P. 
Ginsburg, Mara L. Merlino & Veronica Dahir, Asking the Gatekeepers: A 
National Survey of Judges on Judging Expert Evidence in a Post-Daubert 
World, 25 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 433 (2001). 
26 Id. at 444–48. 
27 Guthrie et al., supra note 24; Andrew J. Wistrich, Chris Guthrie & 
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible Information? The 
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although judge and jury decision making has been the subject of 
some study, little work directly compares judge and jury responses 
to the same scientific issues. 
A study of judicial responses to scientific evidence within the 
context of a specific case is worthwhile. First, judges’ reactions are 
valuable in their own right, as they regularly encounter scientific 
evidence in both criminal and civil cases and must now evaluate the 
scientific soundness of such evidence in making admissibility 
decisions. They preside over the trial and have considerable power. 
Second, judges are the obvious alternative to juries. Comparing 
judge and jury responses to the same material might highlight 
distinctive attitudes, skills, and abilities of judges versus juries, 
which in turn could have implications for structuring their decision 
making and allocating tasks between them. In a 2005 survey of 
research contrasting judge and jury decision making, Professor 
Jennifer Robbennolt concluded that while direct contrasts of judge 
and jury responses are still relatively uncommon, they can be 
valuable “to define the contours of . . . differences and similarities 
and to inform mechanisms by which the decision making process 
can be improved.”28  This project allows us to obtain comparative 
information about judicial and juror reactions to scientific material 
presented in the courtroom. 
II.  THE JURY MTDNA STUDY 
The mock jury study employed a case involving scientific 
evidence to facilitate the analysis of juror responses to scientific 
information.29 The study also explored whether suggested jury trial 
reforms could improve the jurors’ comprehension and use of the 
                                                           
Difficulty of Deliberately Disregarding, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1251 (2005) 
(finding judges are susceptible to several cognitive biases). For a summary of 
this literature, see Joseph Sanders, Michael J. Saks & N.J. Schweitzer, Trial 
Factfinders and Expert Evidence, in DAVID FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN 
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE (forthcoming 2008). 
28 Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Evaluating Juries by Comparison to Judges: A 
Benchmark for Judging?, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 469, 509 (2005) (surveying 
research comparing judge and jury decision making). 
29 TESTING THE EFFECTS, supra note 7. 
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scientific evidence.  The mock trial, based on the facts and evidence 
presented in State v. Pappas,30 purposefully included ambiguous 
nonscientific evidence along with dueling scientific expert 
testimony about mitochondrial DNA evidence that linked hairs 
from the sweatshirt of a fleeing robber to the defendant in the case. 
Typically, forensic DNA testing employs strands of nuclear 
DNA, but when the quantity or quality of nuclear DNA makes it 
unsuitable for analysis, mitochondrial DNA (“mtDNA”) analysis 
may be used.31 Because there are hundreds or thousands of 
mitochondria in each cell, fewer cells are needed for mtDNA 
analysis than for nuclear DNA analysis.32 The mitochondria in all 
cells are copied from the fertilized egg cell with mitochondria 
exclusively from the mother.33 Therefore, individuals in the same 
maternal line of descent have the identical mtDNA sequence. 
MtDNA matches are not as definitive as nuclear DNA matches 
because of the maternal inheritance issue and the smaller number of 
base pairs that are compared in mtDNA as opposed to nuclear 
DNA analyses.34 Nonetheless, it is useful in some forensic contexts 
and has been admitted as evidence in U.S. courts.35 
The jury study used volunteers from the jury pool in New 
Castle County, Delaware who were not needed for a trial that day.  
                                                           
30 776 A.2d 1091 (Conn. 2001); see also Marlan D. Walker, Note, 
Mitochondrial DNA Evidence in State v. Pappas, 43 JURIMETRICS J. 427 (2003) 
(discussing the Pappas case). 
31 U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, LESSONS LEARNED FROM 9/11: DNA 
IDENTIFICATION IN MASS FATALITY INCIDENTS 66–65 (2006), available at 
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/214781.pdf (describing DNA techniques 
employed in identifying remains from 9/11 disaster). 
32 Julian Adams, Nuclear and Mitochondrial DNA in the Courtroom, 13 J. 
L. & POL’Y 69 (2005); David H. Kaye & George F. Sensabaugh, Jr., Reference 
Guide on DNA Evidence, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 
485, 495 (2d ed. 2000), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup 
/sciman09.pdf/$file/sciman09.pdf (providing basic and advanced reference 
material on DNA). 
33 Adams, supra note 32, at 73–74; Kaye & Sensabaugh, supra note 32, at 
495. 
34 Kaye & Sensabaugh, supra note 32, at 495. 
35 Adams, supra note 32; Edward K. Cheng, Mitochondrial DNA: 
Emerging Legal Issues, 13 J.L. & POL’Y 99 (2005). 
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The jurors were assembled in groups of eight and watched a 
videotape of the mock trial. The study varied whether mock jurors 
were able to use specific trial reforms such as note-taking, asking 
questions of experts, following a checklist, and using notebooks 
containing experts’ slides and a glossary of DNA terms. We 
assessed overall comprehension of the scientific evidence and then 
further compared jurors who were permitted to employ different 
reforms for how well they understood mtDNA. 
The research employed a variety of measures to assess juror 
comprehension. Jurors rated how well they thought they 
understood the evidence, provided their own definitions of 
mtDNA, and answered a set of true-false questions about mtDNA 
evidence and inferences that could be drawn from the evidence. 
Dissertation research by Erin Farley further examined how mtDNA 
evidence was discussed in the mock jury deliberations.36 The 
results have been reported in a series of articles.37 This article 
integrates selected juror responses with those of judges who 
responded to the same mock trial materials. 
III.  THE JUDGE MTDNA STUDY 
During my presentation at Science for Judges IX, I asked judges 
to contribute to their own scientific education by agreeing to take 
part in a research project. The 65 judges who agreed to do so 
became participants in a mock trial study, using many of the same 
materials as the Jury MtDNA Study. The Judge MtDNA Study 
fulfilled several purposes. First, it used active learning to convey 
methodological details of mock jury research. It allowed judges to 
see close up how jurors’ understanding of scientific evidence was 
measured.38 By participating as subjects themselves, judges could 
                                                           
36 Erin Jennifer Farley, Deliberating Science: Juries, Scientific Evidence and 
Commonsense Justice (2006) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of 
Delaware) (on file with author). 
37 See sources cited supra note 7. 
38 Scientific studies have demonstrated some of the advantages of active 
learning in educational settings. For a review, see DEE FINK, CREATING 
SIGNIFICANT LEARNING EXPERIENCES (2003).  For an application of learning 
theory to jury decision making, see B. Michael Dann, “Learning Lessons” and 
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gain an appreciation of the strengths and limitations of mock jury 
experiments. 
The Judge MtDNA Study was also valuable as a scientific 
project. It permitted an opportunity for a direct contrast between 
judge and jury responses to the evidence about mtDNA. We could 
compare judicial responses to jury responses, allowing us to 
observe overlap and divergence. The ability to contrast judge and 
jury reactions to the same scientific evidence within the context of 
a mock trial is a novel contribution of this project. 
From a scientific perspective, it would have been ideal for 
judges to view exactly the same videotape as the jurors. For 
practical reasons—there was not enough time in the event-filled 
Science for Judges IX conference schedule—such a viewing was not 
possible. Consequently, judges read a short summary of 
background information about the case in lieu of watching the lay 
witnesses be examined and cross-examined in the mock trial video. 
Judges then watched video clips of the prosecution’s expert, the 
defense expert, closing arguments by both attorneys, and the 
judicial instructions. The judges completed two questionnaires, one 
before and one after watching the mock trial, that contained many 
of the same questions the mock jurors answered. The following 
morning, a presentation of the preliminary results to judges 
highlighted the areas in which they overlapped and the domains in 
which they diverged from the jurors who saw the mock trial. 
IV.  JUDGES AND JURORS: SOME BACKGROUND DIFFERENCES 
It is important to note a number of background differences 
between the judges and the jurors so that their respective responses 
to the scientific testimony are in context. The most obvious 
difference is their educational experiences. The juror participants in 
the study represented a wide range of educational levels, including 
2% who had not graduated from high school, 24% who had a high 
school degree, 30% who had taken some college courses, 29% with 
college degrees, and 14% who did post-graduate work beyond their 
                                                           
“Speaking Rights”: Creating Educated and Democratic Juries, 68 IND. L. J. 
1229 (1993). 
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four-year college degrees. Judges weighed in at the top end of this 
spectrum with college degrees and post-graduate law degrees. 
But how much science background do judges have? Some 
scholars have speculated that many judges have little attraction to 
or aptitude for math and science.39 The twin mtDNA studies offer 
a first comparative look at the math and science background of 
judges and jurors, albeit jurors from a single jurisdiction and judges 
who attended a Science for Judges workshop. These judges might 
differ in unknown but relevant ways from their colleagues who did 
not attend the workshop. A priori, it seems likely that they would 
be more interested in science and also that they might have more 
background in science than their judicial peers (the reverse could be 
the case, however, if judges are drawn to the workshop because 
they believe they do not have sufficient scientific background to 
manage their cases). 
Jurors and judges both indicated the number of science and 
math classes they took in high school and in college. For judges, the 
reported average was 10.29 courses across high school and college. 
This number was not statistically different from the average 
number of science and math courses (9.72 courses) reported by 
members of the jury pool. 
Because policymakers regularly argue in favor of highly 
educated or blue ribbon juries in technically demanding cases, it is 
informative to compare both of these averages to the subgroup of 
jurors, 33% of the overall juror sample, who possessed college 
degrees and who thus might be a reasonable blue ribbon jury 
option. This group reported an average of 14.04 science and math 
courses in high school and collegesignificantly more courses on 
average than the judges.40 If science and math courses provide 
crucial background for the understanding of scientific evidence in 
the courtroom, then the college educated blue ribbon jurors possess 
more of that background than either the pool of judges or the full 
pool of jurors. 
Of the pool of judges, five reported having some job experience 
in math or science. Not surprisingly, these judges also reported 
                                                           
39 See Sanders et al., supra note 27, at 2 (manuscript page). 
40 F (1, 241) = 8.35, p = .004. 
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significantly more coursework (an average of 18.6 courses) than 
those without job experience (an average of 9.39 courses).41 Sixteen 
percent of the jurors and 52% of the blue ribbon college educated 
jurors reported job experience in math or science. Like the judges, 
jurors with job experience in math and science tended to have more 
math and science coursework. For example, college educated jurors 
with relevant job experience reported 16.88 math and science 
courses in high school and college, compared to 11.11 courses for 
those without job experience.42 
When asked how much scientific evidence they had 
encountered in their work as judges, most judges at the conference 
reported that they had at least moderate exposure to scientific 
evidence in the courtroom. Thirteen percent reported only a small 
amount, 66% recalled a moderate amount, and 21% said they had a 
great deal of exposure. Notably, the judges who said they 
encountered “a great deal” of scientific evidence in their judicial 
work did not report having more of a science and math background. 
The average for these judges was 7.9 courses—slightly but not 
significantly below the average for all judges. 
V.  REACTIONS TO THE MOCK TRIAL VIDEOTAPE AND MTDNA 
EVIDENCE 
Upon examining judges’ responses to the questionnaires and 
mock trial videotape clips, one is struck by the overall similarity to 
the average responses of the jurors. When differences emerged, it 
was often in the direction of judges, compared to jurors, giving 
greater credence to experts and the mtDNA evidence. The college 
educated jurors resembled other jurors more than they did the 
judges. 
Before watching the video excerpts, jurors and judges were 
asked to give their views about the reliability of DNA evidence as a 
category of evidence. Judges averaged 4.49 on a 1 to 5 point scale, 
                                                           
41 F (1, 49) = 9.65, p = .003. 
42 College educated jurors were significantly more likely than judges to 
have math and science job experience, F (1, 265) = 38.91, p < .0001. And in 
turn, college educated jurors with math and science job experience had more 
related coursework, F (1, 189) = 24.41, p < .0001. 
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where 5 equaled extremely reliable. These findings were quite 
comparable to the jurors’ and college educated jurors’ average 
ratings of 4.56 and 4.59, respectively. Thus, both judges and jurors 
began the study with similar and highly favorable views about the 
general reliability of DNA evidence. 
We asked both judges and jurors how much they had heard 
about mtDNA analysis before they participated in the study. A 
total of 52% of the jurors who participated had heard nothing 
about mtDNA, compared to 25% of the judges. This circumstance 
is undoubtedly at least partly explained by the fact that the jury 
study was conducted in 2003, when the use of mtDNA evidence 
was beginning to be used more extensively in courtrooms.43 Judges, 
on the other hand, were surveyed in 2007 when the forensic use of 
mtDNA evidence had become more common and was generally 
accepted in legal cases.44 
 Judges for the most part reported that it was easy to follow the 
expert testimony and that they understood it well. They reported 
greater comfort with the expert testimony than did jurors. Forty 
percent of the jurors, 50% of the college educated jurors, and 62% 
of the judges said it was easy to follow the expert testimony about 
mtDNA evidence.45 Similar minorities of all three groups admitted 
having problems following the testimony: 21% of the jurors, 19% 
of the college educated jurors, and 17% of the judges said it was 
difficult to follow the testimony. Forty-seven percent of the jurors, 
54% of the college educated jurors, and 55% of the judges were 
confident that they understood the mtDNA well or very well after 
hearing the expert witnesses.46 
Figure 1 shows how judges and jurors rated the defense and 
                                                           
43 Adams, supra note 32; Cheng, supra note 35 (describing changes over 
time in acceptance of mtDNA evidence). 
44 Adams, supra note 32 (describing growing judicial acceptance of mtDNA 
evidence); Cheng, supra note 35 (discussing legal questions arising with the use 
of mtDNA evidence). 
45 The judges expressed significantly more ease in following the testimony 
compared to the full jury sample (F (1, 542) = 5.12, p = .024); but not 
compared to college educated jurors (F < 1, ns). 
46 Responses of judges and jurors did not differ significantly on this 
question. 
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prosecution expert witnesses. Credibility ratings for the 
prosecution expert were comparable (8.01 for judges; 7.62 for 
jurors). However, judges rated the defense expert as significantly 
more credible than did jurors (7.98 for judges and 7.10 for jurors).47 
The college educated jurors rated the experts’ credibility nearly 
identically to the other jurors (7.78 for the prosecution expert and 
7.11 for the defense expert). It is interesting to speculate about 
why the defense expert is rated differently by judge and jury. 
Judges may be more accustomed to the adversarial and back-and-
forth character of expert testimony, or, judges may have recognized 
the validity of some of the defense expert’s points that were not 
identified by the jurors.  
 
 
Judges watched only portions of the videotaped trial, whereas 
jurors watched the entire videotaped trial, including testimony by a 
police officer, an eyewitness, and the defendant. Thus, their 
exposure to the case facts was not identical. Interestingly, however, 
judges’ estimates of the likelihood that the defendant was the 
robber were significantly higher than those of the jurors (85% 
                                                           
47 Credibility ratings for the prosecution expert did not differ significantly 
between judges and the full sample of jurors; however, ratings of the defense 
expert did differ significantly: F (1, 539) = 11.38, p = .001. 
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probability for judges, versus 69% for all jurors and 73% for 
college educated jurors). Judges were also more likely to convict. 
This result converges with the typical finding in judge-jury 
agreement studies that judges are more willing to convict when 
juries would acquit.48 
Additionally, judges were more positive than jurors about the 
reliability and integrity of the mtDNA evidence used in the case. 
Figure 2 compares the responses of judges and jurors to a question 
asking, “How reliable was the mtDNA evidence presented in this 
case?” More judges saw it as very or extremely reliable. The 
opinions of college educated jurors about mtDNA’s reliability fell 
between judges and the rest of the jurors. 
 
Figure 2. Reliability of MtDNA Evidence in the 
Case
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48 For the judge-all jury comparison of the probability that the defendant is 
the robber, F (1, 541) = 14.72, p < .0001; for judges versus college educated 
jurors, F (1, 268) = 8.03, p < .005. For findings of judge and jury verdict 
differences in other studies, see KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 13, at 58 
(showing judges more likely to convict when juries would acquit than vice 
versa); Eisenberg et al., supra note 15, at 181 (showing judges more willing to 
convict than juries). 
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Both judges and jurors thought the mtDNA evidence presented 
by the prosecution was very unlikely to be contaminated.49 As 
shown in Figure 3, the most common response in both groups is 
that it is not at all likely to be contaminated. Judges are 
extraordinarily confident; 91% of judges rated the likelihood of 
contamination as not at all likely or only slightly likely. The 
majority of jurors (76%) responded the same. However, significant 
minorities of both judges (9%) and jurors (24%) thought that 
contamination was at least somewhat likely. The views of college 
graduate jurors fell between the judges and the whole jury sample. 
Figure 3. Likelihood of Contamination of MtDNA 
Evidence in the Case
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49 TESTING THE EFFECTS, supra note 7, at 52–54 (presenting study findings 
related to judgments of reliability and contamination); Science in the Jury Box, 
supra note 7 (analyzing judgments of reliability and contamination). For the 
reliability item, comparing judges and all jurors, F (1, 541) = 13.27, p < .0001; 
for judges versus college educated jurors, F (1, 269) = 6.18, p = .01. For the 
contamination item, comparing judges and all jurors, F (1, 542) = 6.17, p = 
.01. Judges and college educated jurors did not differ significantly on their 
responses to the contamination item. 
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VI.  JUDGE AND JURY COMPREHENSION OF THE SCIENTIFIC 
EVIDENCE 
Eleven true-false questions tested the participants’ 
understanding of the basic science behind mtDNA and the 
understanding of inferences that could be drawn from mtDNA 
evidence. These questions included asking about biological facts 
concerning mtDNA, including the location of the mitochondria 
within the cell, the importance of the sequence of base pairs, the 
maternal heritage of mtDNA, and the concept of heteroplasmy. 
They also included questions about inferences that could be drawn 
from a mtDNA match.50 Jurors were asked most of these questions 
both before and after deliberating with other jurors. For the 
purposes of comparing responses to the individual items with 
judges, I used the post-deliberation measures of the jurors since 
jury deliberation is an essential and important part of jury fact-
finding. 
Overall judges and jurors responded similarly and accurately to 
most of the individual items testing knowledge and inferences about 
mtDNA evidence. Of eleven items, the responses were 
significantly different for three items and statistically 
indistinguishable on the remaining eight items. 
Notably, an inspection of responses to the individual true-false 
items for overlap and divergence reveals that one item produced the 
largest difference between judges and jurors. Judges and jurors were 
asked whether the following claim was true or false: “The mtDNA 
evidence in this case is completely irrelevant because a substantial 
number of other people could also be the source of the hairs.” As a 
scientific matter, the mtDNA evidence is not completely irrelevant; 
it should be weighed and considered along with the other evidence 
that points to the defendant as the robber.51 Nevertheless, the 
defense attorney asked both experts about the likelihood of other 
people being the source of the hairs, and he made the (false) claim 
of complete irrelevance in his closing argument. Judge and jury 
                                                           
50 TESTING THE EFFECTS, supra note 7, at 47 (listing questions probing 
specific knowledge about mtDNA). 
51 See Statistics in the Jury Box, supra note 7, at 804. 
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responses diverged on this item: 51% of the jurors and 85% of the 
judges answered correctly that the mtDNA information was 
nonetheless relevant.52 
Responses to two other items showed smaller differences—one 
in which jurors were more likely to provide an accurate response 
and the other in which judges were more likely to be correct. When 
asked whether the mtDNA evidence could have come from the 
defendant’s brother if he and the defendant had the same mother 
but different fathers, 90% of the jurors and 82% of the judges 
correctly answered yes.53 It is interesting that jurors performed so 
well on this item. Erin Farley’s analysis of the mock jury 
deliberations revealed that most jury deliberations included a 
discussion about the maternal line of inheritance of mtDNA.54 The 
jurors’ superiority on this question as compared to the judges’ 
performance could well be due to the fact that they deliberated and 
discussed the matter. 
The final item showing a statistically significant difference 
between judges and jurors involved a basic question about whether 
nuclear DNA or mtDNA had the same ability to prove identity, or 
whether one was superior to the other. The correct answer is that 
nuclear DNA is superior. Most jurors (89%) answered this 
question correctly, as did all but one judge. The higher performance 
of the judges is statistically significant.55 
Not surprisingly, college educated jurors, jurors with a 
substantial number of math and science courses in high school and 
college, and jurors with extensive job experience in math and 
science all performed better on the true-false questions as 
compared to jurors with less education, fewer relevant courses, or 
no relevant job experience.56 The same group of jurors also 
significantly out-performed the judges on three of the eleven 
questions. All three items in which the college educated jurors 
                                                           
52 χ 2 (1, N = 545) = 26.38, p < .001. 
53 χ 2 (1, N = 545) = 4.46, p = .04. 
54 Farley, supra note 36, at 166–68. 
55 χ 2 (1, N = 545) = 5.63, p = .02. 
56 TESTING THE EFFECTS, supra note 7, at 50–52 (analyzing impact of 
education on juror performance); Science in the Jury Box, supra note 7 
(analyzing impact of education on juror performance). 
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showed greater accuracy than the judges involved the maternal 
lineage of mtDNA—whether mtDNA came from both the mother 
and the father (no), whether the same father was sufficient (no), 
and whether the same mother was sufficient (yes) for an mtDNA 
match.57 The only item showing an advantage of judges over 
college-educated jurors was the “completely irrelevant” question 
about the mtDNA evidence. Like their peers, the college educated 
jurors were divided in their responses to this question; by a 
substantial margin, judges were more likely to get it right.58 
In defense of both the jurors and the judges, even on the 
questions on which the other decision maker showed a relative 
advantage, substantial majorities of both types of decision makers 
answered correctly. The one exception was the “completely 
irrelevant” question in which a bare majority of jurors answered the 
question correctly (51%). 
The responses were combined into an 11-item MtDNA 
Comprehension Scale. Each correct answer contributed one point 
to the scale. Responses of “no answer,” “don’t know,” and 
incorrect answers were all assigned zero points. Thus, the scale 
could range from zero (all questions incorrect) to eleven (all 
questions correct). Both judges and jurors performed reasonably 
well, as measured by this scale, scoring between eight and nine 
questions correct on average. The full sample of jurors answered an 
average of 8.26 questions correct, and judges answered a marginally 
higher average of 8.69 questions correct. The college educated 
jurors answered 8.80 questions correct on average.59 
                                                           
57 On the question about whether mtDNA comes from both mother and 
father: 95% correct for college educated jurors and 88% correct for judges; χ2 (1, 
N = 272) = 4.48, p = .03; the same father question: 94% college educated jurors 
and 86% judges, χ 2 (1, N = 545) = 4.50, p = .03; the same mother question: 
93% for college educated jurors and 82% for judges, χ 2 (1, N = 545) = 7.83, p = 
.005. 
58 55% for the college educated jurors versus 85% for the judges; χ2 (1, N = 
545) = 18.35, p < .001. 
59 The comparison between the full juror sample and judges was marginally 
significant: F (1, 543) = 2.69, p = .101. The comparison between college 
educated jurors and judges was not statistically different, F < 1, ns. To avoid 
reader confusion, I point out that two other reports of these jury data, TESTING 
THE EFFECTS, supra note 7; Science in the Jury Box, supra note 7, employ a 
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Thus far this article has compared individual judges and 
individual jurors. However, juries decide as a group. To take into 
account the group nature of jury decision making, it would be 
useful to obtain an average of the individual jurors’ responses for 
each jury and compare those average responses to the individual 
responses of judges. Since juries can benefit from their more 
knowledgeable members, it is also of interest to include in the 
comparison the highest scoring members of each jury. 
Figure 4 compares the responses of the judges, the average jury 
responses post-deliberation (that is, the mean of the juror 
responses within each jury), and the responses of the best 
performing juror in each jury.60 The figure employs cones to 
indicate the proportion of each group at each number of correctly 
answered questions. The heights of the cones reflect the relative 
proportions of each group answering a particular number of 
questions correctly. The figure reinforces the individual numerical 
comparisons presented above, showing that the vast majority of all 
types of decision makers perform reasonably well. The jury 
averages peak at eight and nine questions correct, with 44% and 
30% of juries at each point.  The best jurors on each jury score at 
the top end of the scale, understandably, with 42% and 47% 
answering ten and eleven questions correct respectively. Individual 
judges are spread a bit more broadly over the range from five to 
eleven questions, with the highest proportions of judges answering 
nine and ten questions correctly (22% and 26%, respectively). 
 
 
                                                           
different set of items in the comprehension scale, eight items that were asked 
both before and after the jury deliberations. 
60 Average responses for each jury were rounded to the nearest whole 
number for the purposes of the figure. 
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VII. JURY TRIAL INNOVATIONS TO IMPROVE THE JURY’S 
COMPREHENSION AND USE OF SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 
The focus of this article has been on comparing judges and 
jurors and considering how educational attainment and science and 
mathematics background are related to judgments about scientific 
evidence. Policymakers who are concerned about jury performance 
in complex trials have advocated the use of a range of trial 
innovations designed to improve a juror’s ability to understand 
scientific evidence and apply it in the context of a legal case. Many 
of these innovations are summarized in the recently revised Jury 
Trial Innovations compendium from the National Center for State 
Courts, as well as the 2005 American Bar Association publication, 
Principles for Juries and Jury Trials (the “Principles”), a set of 
guiding ideals for the conduct of jury trials.61 To promote juror 
understanding of the facts and the law, the Principles encourage a 
range of techniques, including juror note-taking, the use of jury 
notebooks in appropriate cases, the careful consideration of using 
                                                           
61 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, PRINCIPLES FOR JURIES AND JURY TRIALS 
(2005) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES FOR JURIES AND JURY TRIALS]; JURY TRIAL 
INNOVATIONS (G. Thomas Munsterman, Paula L. Hannaford-Agor & G. Marc 
Whitehead eds., National Center for State Courts, 2d ed. 2006). 
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juror questions, and the option of allowing jurors to discuss 
evidence as the case proceeds rather than waiting for the final 
deliberations.62 
To compare and contrast how different jury trial innovations 
might help jurors master the details of scientific evidence, the Jury 
MtDNA Study varied whether mock jurors could use note-taking, 
ask questions about the scientific expert testimony, use a checklist, 
employ a jury notebook containing the experts’ slides and a 
glossary of DNA terms, or use multiple innovations. Jurors 
reported that they benefited from using the innovations.63 We 
measured the impact of the use of these innovations on jurors’ 
scientific understanding using a subset of the true-false questions 
analyzed in this article. The results were mixed, but two 
innovations produced small but statistically significant benefits on 
jury comprehension. Jurors who were allowed to use checklists and 
jury notebooks did better on the true-false questions compared to 
jurors who were not permitted to use these trial innovations. 
Although a juror’s opportunity to take notes has been linked to 
better performance in other jury studies,64 note-taking was not 
associated with higher scores in this mtDNA project. One likely 
explanation for this departure is that juror note-taking is most 
helpful as a memory aid, and the Jury MtDNA Study was a 
relatively short couple of hours from start to finish.65 Similarly, the 
                                                           
62 PRINCIPLES FOR JURIES AND JURY TRIALS, supra note 61, at 91–105 
(recommending specific jury innovations to promote juror understanding). 
63 TESTING THE EFFECTS, supra note 7, at 55–74 (describing in technical 
detail the juror responses to trial innovations); Jury Trial Innovations and Juror 
Understanding, supra note 7, at 155 (summarizing juror responses to 
innovations). 
64 B. Michael Dann & Valerie P. Hans, Recent Evaluative Research on Jury 
Trial Innovations, 41 CT. REV. 12, 13–14 (2004) (reviewing studies of juror 
note-taking); Lynne ForsterLee & Irwin Horowitz, The Effects of Jury-Aid 
Innovations on Juror Performance in Complex Civil Trials, 86 JUDICATURE 
184 (2003) (describing research project finding that juror notes improved jury 
performance). 
65 See JURY TRIAL INNOVATIONS, supra note 61, at 126–27 (describing 
multiple advantages of juror note-taking); PRINCIPLES FOR JURIES AND JURY 
TRIALS, supra note 61, at 94–95 (commenting on the benefits of juror note-
taking). 
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chance to ask questions did not improve performance possibly 
because very few mock jurors in the mtDNA study availed 
themselves of the opportunity to ask questions of the experts.66 
CONCLUSION 
As is common in scientific research, the Jury MtDNA Study 
had both strengths and limitations. Strengths include the fact that it 
used jurors from a jury pool, adapted an actual case, and presented 
it in substantial detail following the format of an actual trial. 
Although the trial was presented on videotape, for purposes of 
control, the taped trial included a real judge, real attorneys, and real 
scientific experts, and jurors deliberated in groups to reach a 
verdict. Nonetheless, it was a videotaped simulation rather than a 
real trial—it was shorter, included less evidence, and used actors 
instead of real witnesses. Jurors came from a single jurisdiction. 
Jurors were selected randomly from volunteers, so the effects of 
attorney and judicial decisions about jury selection did not 
influence the composition of the mock juries. This circumstance is 
relevant because of the possibility that attorneys may attempt to 
“deselect” highly educated jurors in complex trials when attorneys 
presume it will advantage their side to do so. As one state judge 
who participated in the study commented: “in jurisdictions with 
lots of peremptory challenges allowed on both sides, jurors can be 
picked through too much to get rid of almost all ‘educated’ people  
. . . .”67 
Likewise, the Judge MtDNA Study and the comparative 
analysis of judge and jury responses possessed some strengths and 
limitations. Because the group of judges had chosen to attend a 
Science for Judges conference it is quite likely they differed in 
science-relevant ways from their peers. The conference facility and 
environment were probably more distracting than a courtroom. As 
mentioned above, to the extent that judges and the general public 
                                                           
66 For extensive discussion of juror questions of experts, see Diamond, 
supra note 11. 
67 Written comment by state judge, Judge MtDNA Study, Science for 
Judges conference, Brooklyn Law School, Brooklyn NY (2007) (on file with 
author). 
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became more familiar with the forensic use of mtDNA evidence 
from 2003 to 2007, differences in comprehension between judges 
and juries could be due to the expansion of knowledge rather than 
the different identities of the decision makers. Furthermore, a strict 
comparison between jurors who deliberated and judges who 
responded individually is not completely fair to the judges who in 
real life can avail themselves of numerous resources in trial decision 
making.68 Nonetheless, the comparative study was a unique 
opportunity to contrast responses of judges and jurors to the same 
scientific material and learn more about the areas in which they are 
likely to react distinctively or converge in their judgments. 
The results of the judge study affirm the basic similarity of 
judge-jury decision making in cases with scientific evidence, 
although they point to some distinctive qualities of each type of 
decision maker. Judges gave more credence to the defense expert’s 
testimony, yet at the same time were more convinced that the 
mtDNA evidence was reliable and not contaminated. Jurors, 
including college educated jurors, were more concerned than judges 
about reliability and contamination, although, like the judges, they 
generally had substantially positive views of the scientific 
evidence. Another striking difference was that judges saw the case 
against the defendant as stronger and were more likely to convict 
on the evidence. Because the judges read a summary of the 
nonscientific evidence while jurors viewed it on videotape, one 
cannot make too much of the differential in case evaluations, but 
other studies have found judges somewhat more likely to convict 
on the same evidence compared to juries.69 
Most judges and jurors showed good command of mtDNA 
evidence, as evaluated by the true-false questions both groups 
answered. A substantial minority of jurors were susceptible to 
errors in reasoning about the statistical inferences that could be 
drawn from the scientific evidence. The mock jurors’ educational 
                                                           
68 Judges, for example, may draw on reference manuals and other 
background materials, helpful law clerks, special masters, and court-appointed 
experts. See supra text accompanying notes 4–6. 
 69 KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 13, at 58 (showing judges more likely to 
convict when juries would acquit than vice versa); Eisenberg et al., supra note 
15, at 181 (showing judges more willing to convict than juries). 
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attainment and their background in science and math were 
associated with better comprehension of the scientific evidence. 
Two jury innovations in particular—the use of jury notebooks and 
the use of a checklist—also increased jury comprehension, but the 
effects were rather modest. 
Of the three specific true-false questions that produced 
statistically significant differences between judges and juries, judges 
performed better on two questions and jurors on one question. 
Judges had the advantage on two inferential questions—whether 
mtDNA or nuclear DNA was superior in proving identity and 
whether the mtDNA evidence was irrelevant because people other 
than the defendant could be the source of the hairs. In addition to 
both matters being discussed by the experts, the inferences were 
also part of the prosecutor’s and defense attorneys’ arguments. It 
may be that the more extensive exposure judges have to adversary 
presentations and trial court questioning encouraged them to 
evaluate more critically the adversarial statements about the expert 
evidence.  
Jurors were more accurate than judges on a scientific question 
involving the maternal heritage of mtDNA, and this question was 
discussed in the vast majority of jury deliberations. This finding 
underscores the importance and value of jury deliberation in 
promoting jury fact-finding competence. In addition to the benefits 
of jury deliberation, some of the trial innovations that have been 
recommended as aids to fact-finding appear to help, but results of 
the Jury MtDNA Study indicate that we need to be more creative 
in fashioning jury innovations, especially when it comes to 
assisting jurors in developing appropriate inferences from scientific 
evidence presented in adversarial contexts. 
Looking separately at college educated jurors and analyzing 
their scientific backgrounds and responses to true-false items, this 
study found that the college educated jurors possessed some fact 
finding advantages over their juror peers with less education, and 
even in some instances over judges. The significance of such 
educational factors leads one to consider the possible advantages of 
employing blue ribbon juries in extremely complex trials. The state 
of Delaware, where the mock jury experiment was conducted, is 
one of the few states that still has the option for a special jury 
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drawn from a pool of highly educated or specially trained 
prospective jurors.70 
Although blue ribbon juries were used more frequently in the 
past, they have fallen out of favor in recent years as more 
significance has been placed upon juries that can represent the full 
range of community experiences and perspectives.71 Other research 
focusing upon complex trials has found that jurors with relevant 
background knowledge tend to take the lead in group discussion.72 
The vigorous discussion characteristic of diverse decision making 
bodies also promotes fact-finding.73 Is the fact-finding ability of a 
jury consisting only of jurors with college degrees sufficiently 
superior to that of a jury consisting of jurors with a mix of 
educational backgrounds that the value of using a special jury 
outweighs the fact-finding (and other) advantages of a broadly 
representative jury? That is an interesting question for future 
research. At the very least, the presence of scientifically capable 
members in the regular jury pool suggests that concerns about the 
jury’s inability to handle scientific evidence, so apparent in the 
Daubert trilogy of cases,74 were overblown.  
In sum, the study reinforces the conclusions of other 
researchers that judges and jurors overlap considerably yet diverge 
                                                           
70 OLDHAM, supra note 9, at 207–09. 
71 VIDMAR & HANS, supra note 9, at ch. 3 (describing historical waxing 
and waning of the use of special and blue ribbon juries). 
72 Diamond and Casper conducted a mock jury study that included complex 
expert testimony. The mock jurors were more likely to select fellow jurors with 
relevant coursework (a statistics course) as foreperson, and the forepersons with 
statistics knowledge were more influential. Shari Seidman Diamond & Jonathan 
D. Casper, Blindfolding the Jury to Verdict Consequences: Damages, Experts, 
and the Civil Jury, 26 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 513, 552–53 (1992). 
73 Phoebe Ellsworth, Are Twelve Heads Better than One?, 52 LAW & 
CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 205 (1989) (presenting evidence that robust 
deliberations by diverse juries produce superior fact-finding); Samuel R. 
Sommers, On Racial Diversity and Group Decision Making: Identifying 
Multiple Effects of Racial Composition on Jury Deliberations, 90 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 597 (2006) (finding better decision making in 
racially diverse juries). 
74  The trilogy of cases began with Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharms., Inc., 
509 U.S. 579 (1993), and continued with General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 
136 (1997) and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999). 
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in particular ways.75 Although it is important to keep in mind the 
limitations of this particular comparison between judges and jurors, 
the findings of both similarities and differences provide us with a 
sense about how the same case might be decided by a judge, a jury, 
or a blue ribbon jury. 
 
                                                           
75 See supra text accompanying notes 13–17. 
